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Introduction
In the last few years, we have been observing a gradual involvement of public opinion in political decision making. As a typical example of this trend we should mention participatory budgets, see Ríos et al. (2005a for additional information and references. They constitute an attempt to allow the general public to have a word and aid in deciding and approving how public budgets, mainly in municipalities, are spent. However, till recently, no formal modelling or quantification of citizen preferences has been undertaken and no formal negotiation or group decision support tools have been used, there being little methodology available in this field.
On the other hand, Information Technologies (IT) provide new potential to support stakeholders dispersed, both geographically and socially, in public policy decision making. However, so far, most ideas relating Internet and politics, have been directed towards facilitating traditional standard political methods through IT as with electronic voting instead of voting with a piece of paper. The most challenging goal, however, is to transform, rather than facilitate, public decision-making processes, through the use of IT. There are already several examples of systems used or about to be used for public decision support. Just to quote a few, Lourenco y Costa (2005) describe a system that facilitates consensus building in generating alternatives in public decision making; Gronlund et al. (2005) describe a public decision support system used within a municipality to choose an appropriate transportation system; Rios et al. (2005a) describe PARBUD -a web-based system to support participatory budget elaboration.
There are also attempts of standardization of the wide diversity of tools available, their inventory and their assembly under a common basis, as in the TED project, see infodoc.escet.urjc.es/ted/.
From the analysis of such tools, a number of features that we should demand from them can be formulated. First of all, as the system will be used by the general public, we should not expect much sophistication from users. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on user-friendliness in interfaces with little mathematical sophistication. This does not entail, however, neglecting rigorousness of the implemented methods. Also, the system should be neutral to all users, in the sense of providing them the same complete information.
Given these prerequisites, the aim of our study is to develop a user-friendly procedure implementable on the web that can collect information about the stakeholders' preferences in a transparent and rigorous manner and transform this information into a group decision in a fair way. With a view on simplicity, in Efremov et al. (2006) we proposed to restrict the preference information provided by the stakeholders to their goals. Single-shot identification of a goal has turned out to be the simplest form of expressing preferences, which is convenient for decision makers, see Romero (1991) . Thanks to their simplicity, goal programming methods have found broad applications. However, if the feasibility information is unknown, the goals may be too ambiguous or too pessimistic. To solve the problem, we suggested informing stakeholders about the feasibility frontier, which, in the framework of multicriteria optimization problems, is the Pareto (non-dominated) frontier. This information should aid stakeholders in applying goal-based methods more comprehensively. We simplify the process of informing the stakeholders about the Pareto frontier through its visualization. In the case of more than two criteria, visualization of the Pareto frontier may be carried out through the Interactive Decision Maps (IDM) technique, see Lotov et al. (2004) . Identification of a goal, which is supported through Pareto frontier visualization by IDM and results in the decision associated with the feasible goal, is known as the Feasible Goals Method (FGM), see Lotov et al. (2004) . We argued in Efremov et al. (2006) that preference information in participatory decision making can be restricted to goal identification by means of FGM. Then, a surrogate value function for each stakeholder is constructed, based on the Chebyshev distance from the ideal point of the feasible set. As soon as surrogate value functions are constructed, a large variety of arbitration rules can be applied.
In this work we discuss the implementation of the framework from Efremov et al. (2006) in an experimental Internet-based decision support tool, adapting it to the participatory budget problems. We discuss the results of an experiment we have run on this web resource. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe general features of our framework for participatory decision support, using the IDM technique and applying it to for retrieve the users' preferences. We also outline a goal-based arbitration scheme we use. In Section 3, we describe the mathematical model of participatory budgets and adapt our framework to this problem. Section 4 is devoted to a description of the implementation of the framework in an experimental web-based tool with a particular participatory budget problem as an example. We also discuss some results of an experiment we have run on this web resource. We end up with some discussion.
Description of the framework
Let us introduce some notation. Let X be the feasible decision set and f : X → R d be a mapping from X to the criterion space R d : the performance of each feasible decision x ∈ X is described by a d-dimensional vector y = f (x). The set Y := f (X) is called the feasible criterion set. We shall assume Y to be compact. With no loss of generality, we shall assume that the criteria must be maximized. This defines a Pareto order in the criterion space: by definition, for y, y
where ≻ denotes Pareto dominance. The Pareto frontier of the set Y is defined as 
The RGM/IDM method
At the first stage of our framework, we suggest informing the stakeholders about the Pareto frontier through its visualization using the IDM technique. The key feature of the IDM technique consists of displaying the Pareto frontier for more than two criteria, through interactive display of bi-criterion slices of H(Y ). A bi-criterion slice is defined as follows. Let (y 1 , y 2 ) designate two specified criteria, the so-called "axis" criteria, and z denote the remaining criteria, which we shall fix at z * ∈ R d−2 . A bi-criterion slice of H(Y ), parallel to the criterion plane (y 1 , y 2 ) and related to z * , is defined as
Note that a slice of H(Y ) contains all feasible combinations of values for the specified criteria when the values of the remaining criteria are not worse than z * . Bi-criterion slices of H(Y ) are used in the IDM technique by displaying decision maps. To define a particular decision map, the user has to choose a "third", or color-associated, criterion. Then, a decision map is a collection of superimposed slices, for which the values of the color-associated criterion change, while the values of the remaining criteria are fixed. Moreover, the slice for the worst value of this criterion encloses the slice for the better value of it. In section 4.4 we give an example of exploring a decision map. In Efremov et al. (2006) we argued that it is an innate property of the IDM to provide transparent information about the efficient frontier in the space of four criteria. Using the IDM technique to study efficient frontiers in a space of 5 to 7 criteria may require some training.
After a user of IDM selects his goal, y ∈ H(Y ), the related decision alternative
is computed and is provided to the user, thus constituting the FGM method. In implementations of IDM, H(Y ) is approximated in advance. Effective stable methods for approximating a convex H(Y ) were proposed in Bushenkov and Lotov (1982) . Moreover, the approximation of H(Y ), which requires up to 99% of the computing efforts, is separated from the human-computer exploration of decision maps and can be performed automatically. At the same time, slices of the approximation of H(Y ) can be computed in a moment. This feature of the IDM technique facilitates implementation on computer networks, where decision maps may be depicted and animated on-line. The technique is applied on Internet as a web client-server architecture: the approximation of H(Y ) is accomplished on the server side, while the exploration of the Pareto frontier is carried out by means of Java applets on the user's computer, as explained in Lotov et al. (2004a Lotov et al. ( , 2004b . A Java applet that can display decision maps in an interactive mode is transmitted to the user's computer. The applet displays decision maps and can be used to explore them and identify the feasible goal. After fixing the goal, it is transmitted to the web-server. The web-server receives the user's goal and computes the decision alternative and provides it to the user, which receives the goal-related decision after several seconds, depending on the connection quality.
In this paper, unlike in Efremov et al. (2006) , we consider the case of multicriteria decision making problems where the feasible decision set, X, is a set of a finite number of alternatives. This is the case, for example, of budget allocation problems. We can still apply the approach presented there to this type of problems, but we should notice specifics for this case. First of all, a modification of FGM, the Reasonable Goals Method (RGM) is used. In RGM, feasible strategies are tabulated, i.e. each row corresponds to a strategy, while columns correspond to different criteria. Unlike in FGM, in RGM the EPH of convex hull of a feasible criterion set, EPH(conv(Y )), is approximated and visualized via the IDM technique. That is why, the goal found by a user of RGM can be infeasible. Nevertheless, this goal reflects the users' preferences as well as a feasible goal, acquired in the framework of FGM. Secondly, there is a direct correspondence (2) between the user's goal and the decision alternative in FGM. Additional procedures should be run in RGM, to find a feasible decision with respect to the goal. These can be based on some consideration of proximity of the user's goal and points P (Y ). Then, the closest feasible criterion vectors, and the corresponding feasible decision vectors are found, see Jankowski et al. (1994) for an example of such procedure.
RGM/IDM in a group decision framework
The IDM technique does not establish explicitly the user's preferences. Nevertheless, when we aim at applying this technique for group decision support, we must express the preference information provided by the stakeholders in a unified form usable in a subsequent procedure, in our case, an arbitration method. We shall, implicitly, assume that the preferences of the k-th stakeholder over criterion vectors y ∈ Y can be described by a value function v k (y), where k = 1, . . . , K. Then, the individual preferences of the k-th stakeholder will lead to the decision x k ∈ X that solves the optimization problem
In our case, since value functions v k (y) are not known, we cannot solve for stakeholders the individual optimization problems (3) . Alternatively, in Efremov et al. (2006) we suggested using the participants' goals to construct surrogate value functions for later use in arbitration procedures. We assume that before any arbitration procedure starts, the feasible goals y k k=1,...,K are provided by the stakeholders, as described above, which we assimilate with the optima of the stakeholders' value functions, as in (3). Clearly, the form of the surrogate value function will depend on the interpretation of the participant's goals. Our interpretation of the goals will be as the criterion points on H(conv Y ) with minimal regret, related to the deviation from the bliss point: we use regret functions given by weighted Chebyshev functions
where λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ d ), λ > 0, is the vector of Chebyshev weights. Consider the problem of finding the feasible point, closest to B(Y ) in the sense of Chebysheff function ϕ(Y, λ, y). To guarantee the efficiency of this point, the following problem is considered:
Note that (5) may have several solutions. Denote their set by L(Y, λ k ).
A scheme to estimate individual preferences
In Efremov et al. (2006) , to estimate stakeholders' preferences, we proposed to solve the inverse of problem (5) to find parameters λ k on the basis of the given goal
Consider the modification of the bliss point
, where ǫ i are small positive numbers. In such a way, we assure that y k < B * (Y ). Then, the following scheme for finding parameters λ k is proposed:
Note that
, where δ i is the maximum deviation between conv(Y ) and B * (Y ) with respect to the i-th criterion.
Find λ
3. Normalize vectors λ 0k through:
Note that the following balance conditions hold:
for i, j = 1, . . . , d and k = 1, . . . , K. The balance conditions (9) suggest that the parameters λ k i , i = 1, . . . , d, can be interpreted as "regret coefficients": they balance the regrets associated with losses related to deviations from the bliss point for different criteria.
To find a feasible criterion vector, y k f that corresponds to the k-th participant goal we use the same vector of Chebyshev weights
) and solve problem (5) with it. If there are more than one solution of (5) an additional procedure is needed to choose one.
We, therefore, consider the surrogate value functions
for y ≤ Y , where λ k is calculated using (6) and (8). Note that eachṽ k (Y, y) is concave and the point y k f is one of its maxima on Y . We can then use these functions within any arbitration scheme that applies value functions. Such idea makes it possible to integrate the goal identification supported by the IDM technique with various arbitration schemes. Here, however, we restrict ourselves with a goal-based arbitration rule.
Arbitration rule
Here we outline the arbitration rule we have implemented in our web resource. For each goal y k , k = 1, . . . , K, we consider the vector λ k given by (6), (8). We, then, perform the following operations to find the arbitration point:
1. Find the average vector of Chebyshev weights:
Note that λ 0 has a meaning of averaged regret coefficients.
2. Solve the problem (5) with vector λ 0 . If the solution is unique, let y 0 = s (Y, λ 0 ) be the arbitration point. If there are several solutions, an additional procedure is needed to find a unique y 0 . Note that in the convex case, y 0 would satisfy (9) for λ = λ 0 . Also note that y 0 is Pareto efficient.
3. Define the group decision as x 0 ∈ X such as y 0 = f (x 0 ). If such x 0 is not unique, an additional procedure is needed.
3 Participatory budgets within our framework for participatory decision making support
From a technical point of view, the elaboration of a participatory budget concerns a group of people which must select a subset of projects in view of multiple evaluation criteria, so that, group satisfaction is maximized in a certain sense, the budget available is not surpassed and other possible constraints are expected. For a mathematical model of participatory budgets we refer to Rios et al. (2005a Rios et al. ( , 2006 , who provide detailed technical descriptions. Assume, then, that a group of K persons has to decide how to spend a budget b. There is a set of Q projects, A = {a 1 , . . . , a Q }. Project a q has an estimated cost c q . Assume that the total cost of all the projects from A is greater than b, otherwise there would be no discussion. A feasible budget for the participatory budget problem is a subset of projects, x ⊆ A, which satisfies the budget constraint, that is, such that
There could be other constraints. Let X be the set of all possible feasible budgets.
As in the description of the framework in Section 2, we shall assume that every feasible budget can be assessed with respect to d criteria, though a mapping from X to the criterion space, f : X → R d is given. Each participant aims at maximizing all criteria values. Similarly, we shall assume each participant to be a multiattribute value function maximizer, see e.g. French (1986) . Suppose, we can somehow associate with each feasible budget x the value v k (x) that the individual k gives to x. Let x * k = argmax x∈X v k (x). Would there hold x * 1 = x * 2 = . . . = x * K , this feasible solution would obviously be the group decision. However, typically, various individuals involved will reach different optimal solution. Consequently, an agreement should be sought as a joint decision. Consider the vectors v(x) = (v 1 (x), . . . , v K (x)), associated with each feasible budget x. The individuals' preferences define a Pareto order in the set of utilities of feasible budgets. Let, by definition,
As rational participants would never agree in a dominated budget, clearly, an agreement should be sought within the set of nondominated budgets. The set X of feasible budgets can be transformed to the participants' value set S = v(X) = {v(x), x ∈ X}. The disagreement point is a vector d ∈ R K , whose k-th coordinate represents the value that the k-th participant would obtain if the negotiation breaks down with no agreement. Should there be no information about the non-agreement situation for the participatory budget problem, we could assume that the disagreement point is the origin in the participants' value space: d = v(∅) = 0 ∈ R K . Therefore, the participatory budget problem is represented as a pair (S, d), where S is a finite but potentially very large set. Note that, in this case, randomization makes no sense, physically or economically, and, therefore, S cannot become convex. The problem consists of trying to reach a consensus on a nondominated point of S. Let P (S, d) denote the set of the participants' values of those nondominated budgets which are better than the disagreement point:
) is the set of nondominated feasible budgets which are better than the status quo.
A participatory budget solution concept is a rule associating with each participatory budget problem (S, d), one budget in X, based on the selection of a point in X. As we observed, in our case S is finite, therefore, the solution concept has to be defined in such domains. A sucessful framework that comes from bargaining theory, introduced by (Nash, 1950) , is studied in detail in Rios et al. (2005b) . Here we show how we apply the framework discussed in section 2 to resolve the problem through goal-based arbitration.
We propose to use the framework discussed in section 2 to solve the participatory budget problem. At the first stage, every participant studies the problem in the criterion space, Y = f (X), to find their goals. At the second stage, these goals are aggregated into a group solution via the arbitration rule. Note, that we do not explicitly work with the participants' value set S. Nevertheless, we can interpret our framework from this angle, as explained in section 2.3, where the form of the surrogate value functions were provided. We implicitely associate valueṽ k (Y, f (x)) with each budget x, whereṽ k (Y, y) is the surrogate value function of k-th participant in the form (10).
4 Implementation of the framework in an experimental web tool for a participatory budget problem
We have implemented our framework as a web resource, available at http://bayes.escet.urjc. es/∼refremov/rgmas/pp gecd/, which we briefly introduce here.
Preliminary steps
Before the web tool can be used, one has to initialize it with a specific problem. Namely, one must be aware that the following steps are accomplished:
• The feasible criterion set of the problem is built, that is, all feasible budgets are generated in the form of a table, its rows corresponding to budgets, while columns correspond to different criteria. Each row is given a unique name which permits to establish a correspondence between the set of criteria and the set of solutions.
• The convex Edgeworth-Pareto hull of the feasible criterion set is approximated and stored in the special format on the server-side in a file. Along with the IDM Java applet, it will then be sent upon request to the participants.
We will discuss now the web resource itself, describing the example to be solved.
Description of the example problem
We formulate now our specific participatory budget problem. A detailed description of the problem can be found in Rios et al. (2006) . A university department can spend 10000 euros for educational and research purposes. There is a list of items in which funds could be invested, collected in the table in Figure  1 . From now on, in order to describe the experiment, we shall present screenshots of the web pages presented to users. There is also a set of predetermined criteria to estimate every project that can be compiled with the items. The criteria are as follows:
• The number of students that benefit from the item.
• The number of investigators that benefit from the item.
• The expected number of papers that will appear in two years if this item is approved. The relations between the criteria and the items are given in the table, represented in figure 2.
Description of the functionality of the web resourse
After entering his nick-name, the participant recieves the IDM applet, see Figure 3 . A detailed analysis of the example with IDM is given in section 4.4.
The participant does not know the group preference until he selects his goal (stage 1). As soon as he selects his goal, he can see the page containing the information about his goal, the arbitration point and the arbitration point before the user has voted, see Figure  4 . The information about the user's goal consists of the feasible point, corresponding to the goal and the corresponding budget, i.e. the list of items. The information about the arbitration point consists of the arbitration point itself and the corresponding budget. The previous arbitration point is shown to demonstrate the impact of the user's goal on the group goal. Once the goal is selected, the user gets access to the page where he can be informed about the goal he specified and about the current arbitration point. He can enter this page by introducing his nick-name on the index page of the resource, see Figure 5 . It looks similar to the page depicted in Figure 4 , except that there is no information about the previous arbitration point, and the information about the current arbitration point and the number of users that have participated in the procedure are updated. 
An example of the analysis of the problem with IDM
Let us give an example of how the frontier of the CEPH of our problem can be explored through the use of IDM.
In Figure 3 , the trade-off curves, the number of benefited investigators versus the number of papers they will produce, are depicted for several values of the number of benefited students. The number of papers is given in the horizontal axis, whereas the number of benefited investigators is given in vertical axis. The constraints imposed on the number of benefited students are specified by the colour scale located under the decision map. Any trade-off curve defines the limits of what can be achieved, that is, it is impossible to increase the number of benefited investigators and the number of papers simultaneously, i.e. beyond the frontier, given the number of benefited students.
For example, the trade-off curve, marked in black, is related to the number of benefited students equal or more than 223. It shows how the number of benefited investigators must be decreased to increase number of papers, while keeping the number of benefited students equal or more than 223.
For the number of papers equal to 3, the maximal number of benefited investigators for the given guaranteed level of the benefited students is feasible. Then, with the increment in the number of papers, the number of benefited investigators starts to decrease more and more abruptly. Note that it is necessary to exchange the same number of benefited investigators (about 10) to increment the number of papers from 3 to 7 and from 7 to 8. Other trade-off curves have a similar shape. Note that as the number of benefited students increases, the trade-off between the number of benefited investigators and the number of papers is becoming impoverished. Furthermore, the trade-off curves are becoming farther from each other, which does mean that, for these values of benefited students, even a substantial additional increment of their number results in significant worsening of the trade-off between the criteria related with investigators. Indeed, when the number of benefited students becomes greater than 250, one may call this worsening unjustifiable. On the contrary, as the number of benefited students decreases, the trade-off curves are becoming closer to each other, which means that even a significant decrement in the number of benefited students results in minor improvements of the two other criteria. Indeed, one can see, that it does not make sense to reduce the number of the benefited students less then 145 as soon as there is almost no change of the trade-off curve between the two other criteria. Once having found the appropriate trade-off curve, the analyst of the problem would proceed with finding the compromise between the values of both criteria on the axes, as described for the case of two criteria. Then he would refine his choice by repeating this procedure, for example, assigning the criteria "the number of benefited students" to the axis and the criteria "the number of papers" to the colour scale, etc.
Such analysis may give to an analyst the right idea about reasonable limits of variation of criteria values. After these reasonable limits are uncovered, the analyst may specify his goal from the range of "reasonable" goals depending on his personal tastes. To select a goal, the user of IDM should first choose the trade-off curve, for example, the one stressed in figure 3 , and then, moving the cross over the curve, make his final choice. 
The result of an experiment with the real stakeholders
We recorded information such as the participants' goals, the arbitration points after every goal selection, the time stakeholders needed to understand the instructions on how to use the IDM applet and fix their goal, which varied from 7 to 15 minutes.
Of special interest were the messages that participants left, as we provide them with such an opportunity. Among other comments, they particularly observe that the alternatives are selected according to their representation in the criteria space, i.e. items that correspond to alternatives are not seen, until a particular alternative is chosen. In their opinion, it is fairer than the situation when the choice is made directly over the items because in the last case some participants might be interested in particular items rather than in improving criteria values.
Furthermore, as the experiment was informal, some participants permited us to be present at their IDM sessions, so we could make some observations about the course of decision making. Some participants were already determinate about their preferencies before they studied the decision map. For example, one of the participants had a position that could be formulated as follows: "favor investigators and give students what will remain". Nevertheless, they could see that their strong wish to follow their principled position, that is, the one criterion optimization, would bring them to an unreasonable solution.
Finally, we mention the list of the participants' goals and corresponding items as well as the arbitration point and corresponding items, see Figure 6 .
Conclusions
We have described a simple web implementation of a framework to support group decision making that does not require too much sophistication from participants. This is a scenario that will be more and more usual as e-democracy tools are developed and, consequently, techniques for supporting large groups of non-sophisticated decision makers are becoming increasingly relevant. Participatory budgets are a typical example of this trend. Stemming from the lack of a general methodology and the little use of decision technology in such experiences, we adapted our web tool to the participatory budget problem. We have run an experiment on the web over the problem of spending a fund granted to a University department among several teaching and research needs. The interested reader may take part in it at http://bayes.escet.urjc.es/∼refremov/rgmas/pp gecd/index.html. The system goes through two stages: first, we use a simple visual tool to aid decision makers in finding a feasible budget they prefer and expressing their preferences; second, we use an arbitration rule, to form a fair budget allocation according to the users' preferences. In particular, we have sketched an arbitration strategy using goal-based surrogate value functions. Certainly, we do not consider the arbitration point we find to be some kind of established truth. Our assumption here is that the final screen, Figure 5 , can help in starting negotiations or voting. The important issue here is that even if some usual mechanism like voting will be used to solve a particular participatory budget problem after the procedure we have described in the paper, the participants would vote with a deeper knowledge of the problem. Our future work in this direction will be connected with the development of a negotiation methodology and tools that would accomplish the original framework. 
